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Implementation of Strategic Change by Franchisees: A Sensemaking Perspective
Theresa Langenmayr
Universität Zürich
Abstract
Franchisees play an important role when inter-organizational change, initiated by franchisors, is to be implemented. The
objective of this thesis is to gain insights into franchisees’ sensemaking activities. Drawing on sensemaking theories and
franchising literature, a case study on franchisees in the automotive industry reveals how social processes of interaction,
within and across their organizational boundaries, influence their interpretations of change initiatives. It contributes to the
sensemaking literature through expanding research to inter-organizational change. It also contributes to the franchising
literature through analyzing the franchisees’ role during franchisor-initiated change from a sensemaking perspective.
Keywords: sensemaking; inter-organizational change; franchising.
1. Introduction
Advanced technologies, global markets and mobile cap-
ital are some of the reasons why, nowadays, continuous or-
ganizational change is essential for the competitiveness and
long-term survival of companies (Lüscher and Lewis, 2008).
However, managing change is one of the most challenging
undertakings of an organization. The successful implemen-
tation of change can stimulate a business, whereas failure can
lead to fatal consequences, including business failure (Sonen-
shein, 2010).
Many researchers perceive the shift in cognitions about
an organization and its environment as the main purpose of
strategic change (Bartunek, 1984). Following this, one of the
most important processes of strategic change occurs when
organizational members, when confronted with change, de-
stroy existing and assign new meaning to an organization.
This process through which individuals work to understand
novel and unexpected elements that change entails is called
“sensemaking” and has become a research topic of grow-
ing interest in the context of organizational theory (Maitlis
and Christianson, 2014; Hope, 2010; Gioia and Chittipeddi,
1991).
This thesis draws on recent sensemaking theories. In
contrast to rationalistic views on strategy, which describe
strategic actions as top-down, current studies on sensemak-
ing consider the role of actors outside the senior management
team and analyze their impact on strategy formation (Balo-
gun and Johnson, 2005). Although mainly executives design
the change, other organizational actors who operationalize
new strategies serve as critical change agents. How these
organizational actors assign new meaning to a system affects
whether the change outcomes are in accordance or in conflict
with the anticipated outcome (Hope, 2010).
In general, previous studies on sensemaking gained im-
portant insights into intra-organizational change. “Intra-
organizational” implies that change is designed and im-
plemented within an organization. Scholars focus on how
change initiators and change recipients within organizations
develop shared cognition, perceptions and interpretations of
change initiatives (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014). Recent
studies have shown that middle managers play an active
role in implementing top management’s change initiatives,
as they mediate between the organization’s strategic and op-
erational levels (Balogun and Johnson, 2004; Balogun and
Johnson, 2005; Hope, 2010).
However, little is known about sensemaking during
strategic change, which goes beyond organizational bound-
aries. Thus, this thesis poses the research question: how does
sensemaking take place during inter-organizational change?
In order to answer this research question, the thesis looks
at an extreme case of inter-organizational change: the sense-
making process of franchisees during a franchisor-initiated
change.
In franchising, a franchisor owns a complete business for-
mat and expands it through entering a contractual relation
with independent business owners (franchisees), who pay
fees for the usage of this business format (Croonen, 2010).
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To align their business with upcoming threats and opportu-
nities, franchisors need to constantly implement new strate-
gies in their franchise systems. This can be challenging, as
franchisors need to persuade franchisees to integrate these
changes into their units (?). Although franchisors design
the change, franchisees serve as critical change agents. As
franchisees are often contractually obliged to implement new
strategies and are required to make major financial invest-
ments, they tend to be skeptical towards new changes. The
purposive interaction with franchisees constitutes a chance
in supporting and shaping their change interpretations fa-
vorably. Thus, understanding the franchisees sensemaking
activities creates useful insights for franchisors planning new
strategies for their franchise systems.
A qualitative study is designed as a holistic multiple case
study (Yin, 2003) conducted at car dealers in Northern Eu-
rope, where a change program, initiated by a car manufac-
turer, led to significant structural changes. Data was gathered
from interview sessions with five car dealers, site observa-
tions and archival documents (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003).
The findings reveal how social processes of interaction in-
fluence franchisees’ sensemaking activities. It is shown how
and with whom franchisees mainly interact to align different
possible interpretations of the change initiative.
This thesis contributes to existing literature on both
sensemaking and franchising by analyzing inter-organizational
change from a sensemaking perspective. Further, this thesis
provides useful practical insights for franchisors, planning to
implement new strategies in their franchise system.
2. Literature Review
The literature review consists of two parts. Most impor-
tantly, (1) the status quo of the sensemaking literature needs
to be displayed in order to derive the research question for
this thesis. Further, (2) a brief summary of relevant stud-
ies on franchise systems and on the franchisees’ role dur-
ing franchisor-initiated change serves as a basis for the case
study.
2.1. Sensemaking
Within the next section, the literature on sensemaking
is reviewed. First, the distinct characteristics of sensemak-
ing are outlined and the sensemaking process is displayed.
Then sensemaking will be applied to organizational change.
The section will be concluded with a summary of studies on
sensemaking of different organizational actors. The follow-
ing graphic (Figure 1) serves as an overview of the sense-
making literature containing the most relevant sources. In
this section, the grey marked areas will be outlined in more
detail.
2.1.1. Origin and definition of sensemaking
The term “sensemaking” literally refers to the making of
sense. It can be understood as a process through which indi-
viduals work to grasp a novel, unexpected or confusing event
(Maitlis and Christianson, 2014). How sense is made, why,
and with what effect are the primary questions motivating
researchers analyzing sensemaking.
Scholars who analyzed individuals’ meaning construction
introduced the sensemaking language into the literature.
Garfinkel (1967) first used the term “sense making” when
looking into daily routines of actors as they interpret them-
selves and discuss with others their experience of reality.
Applying sensemaking to the field of organizational theories,
Salancik et al. (1977) studied how an individual’s current
action limits his future choices and actions. In the 1980s,
researchers concentrated more on the cognitive aspect of
sensemaking, developing the main steps of the sensemaking
process (Louis, 1980; Milliken, 1987). In the 1990s, the re-
search on sensemaking broadened and sensemaking related
concepts were introduced (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991).
Due to the high number of studies conducted, there is no
universal “sensemaking theory”, but rather diverse concepts
of sensemaking (Weick, 1995; Balogun and Johnson, 2005;
Maitlis, 2005). Hence, Weick identifies seven distinguishing
characteristics of sensemaking, which are often mentioned in
literature and distinguish sensemaking from other explana-
tory processes (Weick, 1995, p. 17-61).
First of all, sensemaking is self-referential as it depends
on the person who engages in the sensemaking. The person
is rather making sense about himself than about the environ-
ment, determining the implications for his personal situation.
The process of interaction constitutes an individual. Thus,
the sensemaker is continuously reevaluating how he should
present himself to others and how he perceives himself. The
more perceptions a person has of himself, the more mean-
ing needs to be extracted and imposed in any given situation
(Weick, 1995, p. 18-24).
The second characteristic describes sensemaking as ret-
rospective, which means that sensemaking is affected by the
individuals’ “lived experiences” (Schutz, 1967). Louis (1980)
describes sensemaking as a retrospective thinking process.
During that process, individuals form unconscious and con-
scious expectations about future events. When the actual
event differs from previous predictions, meaning needs to be
assigned as an output of the sensemaking process. As vari-
ous meanings could be assigned in retrospective sensemak-
ing, the individual needs values, priorities and clarifications
on preferences as a basis for prioritization. Thereby, emo-
tions affect sensemaking because they influence which retro-
spective activities are considered.
Weick (1995) calls the third characteristic “enactive of
sensible environments”, which refers to the actual “making”
of sense. By assigning meaning to a situation, people con-
stitute the environment that they seek to understand. Thus,
enactment is based on the idea that people play a key role
in creating the environment in which they find themselves.
“People act, and in doing so create the materials that become
the constraints and opportunities they face” (Weick, 1995, p.
30).
Fourthly, sensemaking is social as individuals, who in-
volve themselves in sensemaking, are always part of a socio-
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Figure 1: Overview sensemaking literature; Source: Own figure
material context. People negotiate and create a shared
sense of meaning with others (Balogun and Johnson, 2004).
Maitlis (2005) describes sensemaking as a social process in
which “organizational members interpret their environment
in and through interactions with each other, constructing
accounts that allow them to comprehend the world and act
accordingly”. Although sensemaking in organizations may
either take place through horizontal communication (within
a hierarchical level) or as a result of top-down communica-
tion, it is mainly determined by the social processes at the
recipient level (Balogun, 2003). Further, sensemaking is so-
cial as organizational decisions are made either mutually or
with the knowledge that individual decisions impact other
organizational members (Weick, 1995, p. 49).
The fifth characteristic describes sensemaking as ongo-
ing. Sensemaking has no starting point, such that meaning
is made “in an ongoing present in which past experience is
projected upon possible futures” (Hernes and Maitlis, 2010).
The reality is understood as a flow of continuous activities,
which is interrupted by events that trigger a need for ex-
planation. Through sensemaking meaning is extracted and
assigned to this events, and thereby focal points for future
streams of activity are accomplished. Emotion is what hap-
pens between a stream becoming interrupted and the inter-
ruption being removed.
Referring to the sixth characteristic, Weick (1995) says
that sensemaking “focuses on and by extracted cues”. When
individuals are confronted with a discrepant event that is sur-
prising, single elements are extracted to construct the charac-
ter of the whole event. In order to decrease the complexity of
reality, they seek to clarify what is going on by extracting and
interpreting these elements, so-called cues, from the environ-
ment. Research concentrates on ways individuals notice and
extract cues. Hereby, the context affects what is extracted as
a cue and how it is interpreted. Furthermore, as sensemak-
ing is retrospective, past experience dictates what cues are
chosen (Helms Mills et al., 2010). These cues serve as a ba-
sis for a simplified, subjectively perceived logical order that
“makes sense” of what has occurred. This logical order is
fundamental and contains consistent sets of organizing prin-
ciples, which are unquestioned (Ford and Ford, 1994). These
formed logics enable actors to cope with a complex reality.
The control over which cues serve as a point of reference is
an important source of power.
Lastly, the seventh characteristic describes sensemaking
as driven by plausibility rather than accuracy. This charac-
teristic implies that individuals do not rely on the accuracy
of their perception but rather look for cues that make their
sensemaking seem plausible (Helms Mills et al., 2010).
After having elaborated the seven distinct characteristics
of sensemaking, the different phases of the sensemaking pro-
cess will be described.
2.1.2. Sensemaking process
The sensemaking process can be divided into three main
steps: First, the cues of an unexpected interruption are per-
ceived (triggers for sensemaking). Then interpretations for
this interruption are created (inter-subjective meaning cre-
ation), followed by actions taken (the role of action on sense-
making).
As previously mentioned, sensemaking occurs when
salient, novel, unexpected or confusing cues are noticed
that violate perceptual frameworks (Maitlis and Christian-
son, 2014). However, not all unexpected events trigger
sensemaking. Sensemaking occurs when the discrepancy
between previously formed expectations and actual events is
great enough and important enough to provoke individuals
to ask what is going on and how they should further pro-
ceed. Such discrepancy occurs when either the new event
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is not expected (does not fit into the ongoing interpretation
of the environment) or an expected event does not happen.
While distinguishable, these two types lead to similar conse-
quences. The interruption consumes information-processing
capacity and therefore forces individuals to concentrate on
cues that can be used in sensemaking. The loss of cues
leads people to focus their attention on those aspects of the
interruption judged most important.
Sensemaking is further triggered by cues for which the
meaning is not only judged important but also ambiguous or
for which the outcome is uncertain. Ambiguity and uncer-
tainty are occasions that are prominent in organizations. The
“unexpected” in each of the two cases is somewhat differ-
ent. “Ambiguity” means the presence of two or more possible
interpretations of an event. These interpretations consist
of different elements such as perspectives, feelings, mes-
sages, demands, identities, interest or practices, which be-
come evident through social reflection or interaction (Lewis,
2000). Putnam (1986) describes in his study three differ-
ent sources of ambiguous tensions. Within self-referential
loops (1) ambiguity is embedded in a cohesive statement
or concept. An example is the circular statement “I am ly-
ing”. (2) Mixed messages describe inconsistencies between
verbal and non-verbal responses during social interactions.
One example would be an organization that supports team-
work while monitoring the performance of employees on an
individual basis. The third source of ambiguity are system
contradictions (3), referring to objectified tensions within
systems, such as organizations consisting of autonomous
teams and formalized processes at the same time (Clegg
et al., 2002). Reasons for growing ambiguous conditions are
increasing information, complexity, turbulence and competi-
tion (Cameron and Quinn, 1988, p. 3). Therefore, ambiguity
is perceived when a lack of clarity and high complexity make
multiple explanations of a novel event possible. The problem
in ambiguity is not that information on the real world is lack-
ing, but that information may not resolve misunderstandings
(Weick, 1995, p.93). Thus, sensemaking is triggered through
the existence of too many possible interpretations, whereas
in the case of uncertainty, individuals engage in sensemaking
because they are not capable of forming any interpretations
(Burns and Stalker, 1961). If an individual is uncertain, it
is not a problem of too many interpretations, but of too few.
Milliken (1987) states that the definition of uncertainty has
three aspects: (1) people lack understanding of how compo-
nents of the environment are changing (state uncertainty),
(2) of the impact of the environmental changes on the orga-
nization (effect uncertainty), or (3) of the response options
that are open to them (response uncertainty).
Besides ambiguity and uncertainty as general triggers for
sensemaking, studies have explored different contextual trig-
gers for sensemaking, such as environmental jolts, organiza-
tional crisis, threats to organizational identity and planned
organizational change initiatives. Organizational change, in
contrast to the other described triggers, is anticipated and
planned. It violates expectations of organizational actors
and generates both uncertainty and ambiguity. Change pro-
cesses can either directly target organizational meanings or
may begin with a structural transformation that violates ex-
isting perceptions of the organization and therefore leads to
sensemaking. Despite the structural transformation itself, the
sensegiving of leaders initiating the change can also trigger
sensemaking (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014).
Now that possible triggers for sensemaking have been
identified, the inter-subjective meaning construction will be
looked at in more detail. In most of the studies, sensemaking
is understood to be concerned with language. These stud-
ies can be divided into those which highlight the importance
of narratives, of metaphors or the local and situated nature
of discursive practices (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014). The
most important findings of these studies will be further out-
lined below.
A narrative can be described as “the primary form
by which human experience is made meaningful” (Polk-
inghorne, 1988). It is a verbal or written story about events
whose goal it is to create meaning through putting new
experience in already established categories. Maitlis and
Christianson (2014) perceive narratives as a benefit to or-
ganizational research because a narrative reveals not only
an individual’s involvement and actions but also the process
through which meaning is formed. Sonenshein (2010), who
conducts a study on strategic change, claims that organiza-
tional members construct shared narratives. In analyzing the
process through which this happens, Sonensheim argues that
although leaders may want to convince employees of their
reality through sensegiving, employees can use the leaders
narratives to construct their own meaning. He shows that
employees adopt management’s narratives about the organi-
zation, but draw them on their own experience. This could
result in either a supportive or a subversive narrative.
Metaphors, as a figure of speech identifying similarities
between concepts, are used to connect cues and frames (ref-
erences based on past experience). Weick (1995) says that
metaphors have the ability to create order in unfamiliar sit-
uations, to evaluate and to provide justification for certain
actions. Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) show how organiza-
tional members use metaphors during shared sensemaking
activities first to build a mutual social identity and later
to legitimize their role in the change initiative by redefin-
ing themselves. Cornelissen (2012) further analyzes the
use of metaphors in sensemaking and claims that the use
of metaphors is influenced by the individuals’ commitment
to fulfill certain tasks as part of their professional role and
others’ expectations about them. Thus, the sensemakers’
use of metaphors depends on the interruptive event and the
socio-cultural context (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014).
In diverse studies Balogun et al. focus on discursive prac-
tices to highlight the importance of the socio-cultural context
for meaning construction in organizations. In the social pro-
cess of sensemaking, change recipients interact in exchang-
ing stories, rumors and conversations (Balogun and John-
son, 2005). When analyzing how middle managers engage
in sensemaking, Rouleau and Balogun (2011) explore their
formal and informal conversations with relevant actors in-
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side and outside the organization. They describe, “setting the
scene “ as decisive - a set of practices used to create the con-
text of the conversation. The most important practices are
the setup of an organizational network and the strategic in-
volvement of the right people. Rouleau and Balogun (2011)
conclude that middle managers need an understanding of the
context as a basis for the appropriate use of language and at-
titudes in order to connect to different actors. Sensemaking
and the influence of others are thus not only accomplished
through language, but through the sensitization to its situ-
ated context.
The last part of the sensemaking process is the sense-
makers’ action taken. The sensemakers’ actions are an inte-
gral part of sensemaking as the observation of outcomes and
the consequential learning can serve as input for additional
sensemaking activities. Generally speaking, the sensemak-
ers’ inter-subjective meaning construction can either lead to
a defensive reaction or a proactive management of the novel
event. Vince and Broussine (1996) catalogue five different
types of defensive reactions. A repression (1) is blocking un-
pleasant experiences from memory. Through the application
of a regression (2), the individual resorts to actions that have
provided some security in the past. A projection (3) helps to
transfer personal shortcomings to others, so bad feeling are
transferred into a repository. Reaction formation (4) entails
manifesting the feeling or practice opposite to the threaten-
ing one. In the case of denial (5), the individual refuses to
accept an unpleasant reality.
Tapping the positive potential of a novel event means
finding a way of managing it. Lewis (2000) conducts a study
on sensemaking triggered by organizational paradoxes. Para-
doxes are a special form of ambiguity, where “contradictory,
mutually exclusive elements are present and operate equally
at the same time” (Cameron and Quinn, 1988, p. 2-3). Ac-
cording to Lewis (2000), managing paradoxes during change
means capturing its enlightening potential. The target is to
rethink and reframe past perceptions and practices. Three
means of managing paradoxes are mentioned. (1) The indi-
vidual can accept the paradox and learn to live with it. (2)
Another possibility is to confront oneself with the paradox;
discussing tensions to socially construct a more accommo-
dating understanding. (3) The individual can use its men-
tal capacity to think paradoxically. Through the application
of reframing (reconsidering previously established frames),
tensions become viewed as interwoven.
The possible actions taken by the sensemaker are closely
linked to the previously described sensemaking characteris-
tic “enactive of sensible environments”, which refers to the
reciprocal relation between the sensemakers’ action and his
environment. According to Maitlis and Christianson (2014),
action is important for sensemaking for three reasons. First,
they create the input for sensemaking by generating stimuli
and cues from which one is able to learn about situations. Af-
ter taking actions one can observe the cues generated by the
action. Second, actions can test the understanding generated
through prior sensemaking activities. Thereby, actions serve
as input for new sensemaking, while simultaneously provid-
ing feedback about the sense that has already been made.
Thirdly, actions shape the environment for sensemaking and
therefore change the situation that initially triggered sense-
making.
Figure 2 visualizes the sensemaking process.
2.1.3. Sensemaking and sensegiving
As the amount of research on sensemaking increases,
so does the number of specialized forms of sensemaking
and sensemaking-related constructs. Examples of specific
forms of sensemaking are “cultural sensemaking”, “interper-
sonal sensemaking” and “ecological sensemaking”. The most
popular sensemaking related constructs are “sensebreak-
ing”, ”sensedemanding”, “sense-exchanging”, “sensegiving”,
“sensehiding” and “sense specification” (Maitlis and Chris-
tianson, 2014). For this thesis, sensegiving will be further
outlined and applied to the case study in a later section.
Sensegiving is often studied in the context of how or-
ganizational leaders try to strategically influence the sense-
making of other organizational members. Polanyi (1967),
who first introduced the concept, uses sensegiving to de-
scribe how people fill speech with meaning and make sense
of speech. Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) conduct a deci-
sive study on sensemaking and sensegiving in organizational
change. They describe sensegiving as “the process of at-
tempting to influence the sensemaking and meaning con-
struction of others toward a preferred redefinition of organi-
zational reality”. They develop a sensemaking-sensegiving-
process during which not only leaders, but at a later point
also other organizational actors, become involved in sense-
making and sensegiving as a response. Thus, sensegiving is
not solely regarded as top-down, as the recipients of leaders’
sensegiving activities can form their own interpretations and
can even resist or reject the sense they have been given. At
a later point of this thesis it will be described how an orga-
nization, which has designed a change initiative, undertakes
sensegiving to influence the sensemaking of an actor respon-
sible for operationalizing the strategy.
2.1.4. Sensemaking and organizational change
In many studies sensemaking is seen as an explanatory
mechanism for different organizational processes. The im-
pact of sensemaking on organizational processes, such as
strategic decision-making, innovation and creativity as well
as organizational learning, has been analyzed. For this thesis,
studies on the relation between sensemaking and organiza-
tional change will be further outlined.
According to Ford and Ford (1994), change involves two
interrelated elements. First, the identity of what something
is. And second, the change process as the movement from
old to new. Internal ambiguity arises when new practices
are incompatible with old practices during the phase of or-
ganizational change. Then, conflicts between incompatible
ways for conducting business evolve. According to Westen-
holz (1993), it is “the interplay of internal contradictions that
brings about the change”. Westenholz states that organiza-
tional sensemaking occurs when employees experience an
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Figure 2: Sensemaking process; Source: Own figure
ambiguous situation in the organization. When paradoxes,
as an extreme form of ambiguity, occur during organizational
change, researchers speak of “dialectic change”. In dialectics
a “thing” is a unity of contradictory opposites. “The aim of
dialectical inquiry is to improve decision quality by purpose-
fully infusing tensions into group dynamics, then seeking res-
olution by synthesizing divergent alternatives” (Lüscher and
Lewis, 2008).
The relation between organizational change and sense-
making is recursive, as change can trigger sensemaking and
sensemaking can also accomplish strategic change. Man-
agers (independent of the organizational level) can apply
sensegiving to convince others of the value of changes so
they perceive the redefined reality the same way (Maitlis and
Christianson, 2014). When managers successfully influence
the sensemaking of other organizational actors, these indi-
viduals are motivated to make changes in their own roles and
are able to help others to co-construct ways of working that
are consistent with it (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991). Thus,
actors create a new organizational order through sensemak-
ing in response to environmental changes.
2.1.5. Sensemaking of different organizational actors during
change
For a more comprehensive understanding of sensemak-
ing during organizational change, researchers analyze the
sensemaking process of different organizational actors. Lit-
erature highlights the importance of sensemaking of both
leaders and other organizational actors during organiza-
tional change. Studies that analyze the role of leaders
found that organizational sensemaking is often limited with
leaders controlling the process. When leaders decide to in-
tegrate other organizational actors in the change process,
they rather target the creation of legitimacy than an adap-
tion of the initiative based on employees’ feedbacks (Gioia
and Chittipeddi, 1991). Based on Gioias’ and Chittipeddis’
sensemaking-sensegiving process (1991), other studies fur-
ther examine the varieties of leaders’ sensegiving. Gioia and
Thomas (1996) find that sensegiving depends on the politi-
cal nature of an issue. Bartunek et al. (1999) derive different
leaders’ sensegiving strategies. Within one of these strate-
gies it is shown that leaders who feel personally threatened
are more likely to focus their sensegiving efforts upon the
opportunities that a strategic change entails.
In contrast to sensemaking controlled by leaders, sense-
making can also appear uncontrolled when neither the mem-
bers’ sensemaking activities are organized, nor the outcomes
are integrated into a collective account. Balogun and John-
son (2005) perceive middle managers as decisive change
agents, who are often responsible for implementing new
structures, but have no impact on the upfront change design.
The authors study sensemaking of middle managers during
a top-down change initiative in which the structure of an
organization becomes more decentralized. The unexpected
restructuring creates ambiguity within the middle managers
and thus triggers sensemaking. The findings suggest that se-
nior managers cannot directly influence the sensemaking of
middle managers, but affect organizational meaning creation
through the presence of their actions in rumors and stories
shared by others. The authors describe sensemaking as a
process of social interaction (Balogun and Johnson, 2004).
In their following study, Balogun and Johnson (2005) fo-
cus on these processes of social interaction to better grasp
how middle managers try to make sense of change inter-
ventions. As previously mentioned in the description of the
sensemaking process, they show the extent to which lateral,
informal social processes and inter-recipient sensemaking in-
fluence the change outcome. As middle managers try to im-
plement the change plans of their seniors, their everyday ex-
periences of this implementation and the related behaviors
of others, and the stories, gossip, jokes, conversations and
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discussions they share with their employees about these ex-
periences, shape their interpretations of what they should be
doing. “Change interventions and plans are translated into
action through the medium of these inter-recipient processes,
turning top-down intended change into an emergent and un-
predictable process”.
Based on the findings of Balogun and Johnson (2004),
Balogun and Johnson (2005) and Hope (2010) conducts a
study on the impact of organizational politics on middle man-
agers’ sensemaking and sensegiving activities. The objective
is to identify the politics used by middle managers to influ-
ence the change outcome. His findings suggest that middle
managers have an influence on the sensemaking of seniors by
exerting the “power of meaning”. Thereby, the author refers
to middle managers’ resource power, such as special expertise
in a business unit, used as a tool for controlling the change
process.
Lewis (2000) apply organizational paradoxes to sense-
making when analyzing the role of middle managers in the
process of change. They understand sensemaking as a form
of reframing, which enables actors to alter meanings at-
tributed to changing situations. Their findings show how
organizational change aspects, such as paradoxes of perform-
ing, belonging, and organizing, can be transformed “from a
label to a lens” through the process of working through para-
dox. This process of working through paradox contains five
parts: At first, middle managers are confronted with an in-
tricate, fluid, and fuzzy issue the authors call “mess” (1).
Actors initiate sensemaking by narrowing down this mess to
what is of interest to them. Thereby, they set boundaries for
exploration. The outcome is the definition of a more specific
problem (2) to enable reflection. A clearly stated problem
places an issue on an agenda for solution finding. In the next
step, they analyze why managers felt incapable of solving
problems through the identification of more complicated,
underlying dilemmas (3). A dilemma, in contrast to a para-
dox, is a form of ambiguity that requires managers to make
an either-or decision between polarities. Uncovering oppo-
site sides of an issue lets managers feel more paralyzed. In
this context, paradoxical thinking (4) let the managers rec-
ognize how the tensions between opposing sides are needed
and interwoven. “As managers moved from a mess to a
problem to a dilemma to a paradox, each stage encouraged
deeper exploration toward a more workable certainty” (5).
Workable certainty implies that managers are always in the
process of sensemaking. Lewis (2000) conclude that working
through paradox aids sensemaking because paradoxes serve
as a mean for managers to consider different perspectives,
alter their assumptions and explore issues in fundamen-
tally different ways. Thus, through paradoxical thinking the
sensemaker is able to accommodate, rather than eliminate,
persistent tensions.
Although most of the research on sensemaking focuses on
actors within the organization, some studies consider exter-
nal actors during organizational change. Basu and Palazzo
(2008) develop a process model of sensemaking through
studying a company, which decided to engage in corporate
social responsibility (CSR). The authors explain how man-
agers think, discuss and act with respect to internal and
external stakeholders. The CSR strategy was formulated
not as a direct response to external demands but, instead,
through cognitive and linguistic sensemaking.
Weber et al. (2015) apply the sensemaking-sensegiving
process of Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) to external stake-
holders. The authors want to understand the interactions be-
tween internal and external stakeholders during a post-9/11
organizational change in the Maritime Transportation Secu-
rity Act. The external stakeholders considered are the gov-
ernment and the society who need to legitimize the change.
They identify four critical triggers that lead to a communi-
cation breakdown in the divergent sensemaking process: (1)
unidirectional and lacking communication, (2) multifaceted
understandings of organizational identities, (3) misaligned
cues and (4) the emergence of inter-organizational sense-
making. Their findings illustrate the importance of consider-
ing a broad perspective of legitimate participants in a sense-
making process, as well as constantly adjusting sensemaking
activities to avoid contradictions between participants’ per-
spectives.
During this section, relevant research findings on sense-
making have been outlined. Various studies already gained
profound insights into the sensemaking process of differ-
ent organizational actors. However, studies on sensemak-
ing during change only regard intra-organizational change.
But what if an organization decides to implement a self-
planned change initiative outside its organizational bound-
aries? The change implementer then becomes an impor-
tant change agent, yet his sensemaking process is currently
under-researched. Therefore, this thesis poses the following
research question: How does sensemaking take place during
inter-organizational change?
The focus of this thesis lies on the sensemaking process
of the actor, who implements the change, and not on the or-
ganization, which designs the change.
In order to answer the research question, a case study
is conducted using an extreme case of inter-organizational
change: the sensemaking process of a franchisee during a
franchisor-initiated change. This case is extreme, as the fran-
chisee is contractually obliged to implement changes. Fur-
ther, he needs to invest capital himself and trust in the prof-
itability of the change without being able to influence the
upfront design.
To analyze the sensemaking of franchisees in the process
of franchisor-initiated change, mainly findings of studies on
the sensemaking of middle managers are applied. Neither
middle managers nor franchisees design the change initia-
tive. Nevertheless, both have the task of operationalizing
the strategy in their business unit and therefore play a de-
cisive role in the change process. However, the roles of mid-
dle managers and franchisees have a central distinction: the
middle manager is an internal while the franchisee is an ex-
ternal stakeholder. Hence, different interpretations and pos-
sible contradictions arise when they are confronted with un-
expected change.
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In order to better grasp the franchisor-franchisee rela-
tionship and the organizational role franchisees entail dur-
ing inter-organizational change, the following section out-
lines related literature.
2.2. Organizational change in franchising
Franchising is an important business format, constituting
up to 50% of retailing sales in Western countries (?).
“In franchising, an organizing firm (franchisor) enters
into a contractual relationship with franchisees –typically
small business owners who pay to use a business format
and agree to conform to franchisor standards” (?). On the
one hand, a franchise system provides a solution for certain
agency problems, since franchisees are meant to be more
motivated than company managers running independent
business units that have financial investments at stake and
receive unit profits. On the other hand, problems may arise
in the franchisor-franchisee relation (Dada et al., 2012).
A growing number of studies in management literature
deal with franchising, mainly focusing on difficulties in man-
aging franchise relationships (Davies et al., 2011). Especially
the tension between the franchisors’ wish for system stan-
dardization and the franchisees’ wish for entrepreneurial au-
tonomy is of interest. Franchise system standardization can
be understood as the level of obligations the franchisee has to
fulfill when running his unit, and the degree to which these
obligations are monitored by the franchisor (Cox and Mason,
2007). Thus, a higher degree of standardization leads to a
higher franchisors’ decision-making authority.
The aforementioned tension between the franchisors’
wish for system standardization and the franchisees’ wish for
entrepreneurial autonomy becomes even higher when the
franchisor decides to implement transformational change
forcing the franchisee to make a significant investment in
their unit. Introducing change into a franchise system can
be more challenging than within hierarchical organizations,
as independent business owners need to be convinced of the
opportunities a change initiative entails for their own unit.
While many changes imply financial investments, the fran-
chisee needs to trust in the profitability without being able
to influence the change design. Under these circumstances,
the relation between franchisor and franchisee may be put
under increased pressure (?).
However, only a few studies deal with the role of fran-
chisees during strategic change although their response is key
to a successful implementation. Croonen (2010) generates a
theory on franchisees’ perceptions of trust and fairness dur-
ing change. She provides explanation for franchisees’ per-
ception of distrust and unfairness resulting in resistance or
destructive behavior. She shows that the franchisees’ trust
is mainly based on his perception of distributive, procedu-
ral, and interactional fairness. In order to create, main-
tain or increase franchisees’ trust, the franchisor should have
company-owned units and should integrate franchisees’ feed-
back into the strategic decision-making process.
Later, ? conduct a qualitative study to grasp the fran-
chisees’ reaction to strategic change. The authors identify
three groups affecting franchisee responses and response-
switches during franchisor-initiated change; “the different di-
mensions of expected franchisees satisfaction, a franchisees’
trust in the franchisor and the perception of fairness of the
change process as well as the franchisees’ perception of al-
ternative attractiveness and switching costs”. Their findings
reveal that expected satisfaction regarding the profitability
and trust in the franchise system were the most important
reasons for franchisees to adopt a constructive or destructive
response or to switch between them. Further the authors can
show that franchisees who perceive a higher level of stan-
dardization, take more dimensions of trust and satisfaction
into account when evaluating the franchisor and the fran-
chise system. When franchisees have a high level of trust and
satisfaction, they tend to lower the importance of economic
motivations such as alternatives or switching costs.
Although these studies help to gain insights into fran-
chisees’ reactions to franchisor-initiated change, the process
through which franchisees work to understand change re-
mains unexplored. This thesis applies the concept of sense-
making to the field of organizational change in franchising
to fill this research gap. For the upcoming case study, the fol-
lowing research question is poseFd: How does sensemaking
take place at franchisees during franchisor-initiated change?
3. Research Design
Eisenhardt (1989) developed a process model to build
theory from case study research, which serves as a frame-
work for the research design of this thesis. This process en-
sures that the so-called “chain of evidence” is maintained,
which implies that an external observer should be able to
follow the derivation of any evidence, ranging from initial re-
search question to case study conclusion (Yin, 2003, p. 105).
Eisenhardts’ research process aligns and structures different
research approaches. The most prominent approaches are
grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), which relies on
continuous comparison of data and theory, Yin (2003) de-
sign of case study research and Miles and Huberman (1984)
techniques for analyzing qualitative data. Further literature
is considered across the process stages.
Figure 3 summarizes the process stages, which will be
further outlined in the following sections.
3.1. Getting started
3.1.1. A priori research and deduction of research question
According to Eisenhardt (1989) the first step when build-
ing theory from case study research is the definition of a re-
search question and the building of an a priori construct.
Within the first two chapters of this thesis, the theoretical
framework was constructed and the research question de-
rived. The views on how much research should be conducted
in advance differ. Glaser and Strauss (1967), who introduced
grounded theory into literature, share the opinion that a pri-
ori constructs limit the researcher’s openness to exploratory
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Figure 3: Overview research process; Source: Own figure in accordance with Eisenhardt, 1989
findings. However, as there have already been many stud-
ies published in both the fields of sensemaking and franchise
systems, the findings have been considered in the formula-
tion of a relevant research question for this thesis. Further-
more, Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2003) claim that a pri-
ori constructs provide a better grounding of construct mea-
sures. However, although a theoretical framework has been
established, it has been avoided to develop concrete hypothe-
ses from pre-existing theories prior to the data collection.
Pre-conceived hypotheses structure both data collection and
analysis in advance and limit developing ideas, which are es-
sential for exploratory research (Charmaz, 1990).
3.1.2. Determination of research strategy
Social science research can be conducted in several ways
including experiments, surveys, histories, analysis of archival
information and case studies (Yin, 2003, p. 1). When de-
ciding for a research strategy and its own logic, Yin (2003)
names three conditions to consider: (1) The type of research
question posed, (2) the extent of control an investigator has
over actual behavioral events and (3) the degree of focus
on contemporary as opposed to historical events. This thesis
poses an exploratory research question, which is a justifiable
reason for using an exploratory study, which has the goal of
developing, instead of testing, hypotheses and propositions
for further inquiry (Yin, 2003 p. 6). Related to the second
and third mentioned condition, this thesis wants to examine a
temporary event, where the relevant behavior cannot be ma-
nipulated. Thus, the case study is an appropriate exploratory
research method to choose. Other explanatory methods build
on different data sources. History, for instance, is a method
to deal with a past occasion where no primary resources are
available. Experiments are done when the behavior of par-
ticipants can be manipulated.
As the case study is chosen as an appropriate research
strategy for this thesis, the distinct characteristics will be
briefly outlined. First, a case study examines a current occa-
sion within its real-life context, particularly when the bound-
aries between occasion and context are not clearly obvious.
Second, the case study benefits from prior theoretical propo-
sitions and deals with occasions in which many more vari-
ables are of interest than data points could be considered
(Yin, 2003, p. 14-15).
There are four different types of case study designs, de-
pending on how many different contexts and units of analysis
are integrated into the case study. First, the researcher has to
decide whether he is using a single or multiple case-study de-
sign, depending on the number of cases considered. Possible
reasons for choosing a single case are that it represents a crit-
ical case in a well-formulated theory or that it is an extreme
or unique case. Second, the researcher has to determine if he
either integrates a single-unit of analysis (holistic) or multi-
ple units of analysis (embedded) into his study.
For this thesis a holistic multiple-case study design is
used. In general, multiple cases enable replications so that
the evidence is regarded as being more robust compared
to single-case studies. However, although no single rare or
critical case is regarded as in the single-case study design,
the cases chosen still need to fit for a particular purpose
within the complete spectrum of research. The cases can be
selected either because “they predict similar results (literal
replication) or because they predict contrasting results for
predictable reasons (theoretical replication)” (Yin, 2003, p.
47). Based on the theoretical framework and the decision
for a single-unit analysis, this thesis aims for a theoretical
replication. These replication logics specifically apply to case
studies and cannot be compared to quantitative sampling
methods where statistical methods are used to obtain results
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for subgroups (Yin, 2003, p. 48).
3.2. Selection of cases
As previously mentioned, the multiple-case study design
requires a justified selection of cases. Similar to the field of
theory-testing, the selection of cases in theory-building is de-
cisive, as the cases chosen determine the set of entities from
which the research sample is to be built (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Glaser and Strauss (1967) introduce the concept of theoret-
ical, in contrast to random, sampling. The basic question
in theoretical sampling is: “What groups does one turn to
next in data collection and for what theoretical purpose?”
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 47) As apparent in this ques-
tion, the criteria of choosing groups in theoretical sampling
are those of theoretical purpose and relevance – not of struc-
tural circumstances (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 48). The
researcher chooses any cases that will help to extent theory.
As mentioned before, the purpose of exploratory studies is to
generate theory, not to validate “facts”. Further, theoretical
sampling provides for ongoing joint collection and analysis
of data. The researcher can decide in the process of data col-
lection to align the cases considered as unexpected findings
may occur. The ideal situation according to grounded the-
ory is that the number and types of groups can only be cited
when the research is completed.
Group comparison within a case study is used to com-
pare divergent or similar evidence indicating the same con-
ceptual categories and properties (Glaser and Strauss, 1967,
p. 49). As previously mentioned, this thesis applies the holis-
tic multiple-case study design. This is also due to the fact that
more than one case allows for comparison groups.
The control over similarities and differences helps in dis-
covering categories when analyzing the data. On the one
hand, minimizing the differences among cases increases the
chance of collecting a high amount of similar data on a given
category, and of spotting important differences not caught
in previous studies. On the other hand, maximizing the dif-
ference among cases increases the probability of collecting
heterogeneous data on a category (Glaser and Strauss, 1967,
p. 55-56).
As time available for obtaining results for the thesis is
limited, the groups are chosen at the beginning of the data
collection. However, the theoretical framework helps to ex-
tend the theory on sensemaking and franchise systems to the
not-yet-analyzed inter-organizational change. Thus, in ac-
cordance with grounded theory, the sample is not random
but reflects the selection of specific cases to extend the the-
ory. The idea of minimizing differences is applied to the case
selection.
The chosen cases will be further outlined in the following
section.
3.2.1. Case study setting
The case study sites are dealers of a car manufacturer.
The car manufacturer has almost 5,000 dealers worldwide
and an annual sales volume of over 2 million cars in 2014
(Anon.).
In order to get a better understanding of the organiza-
tional role car dealers entail, Figures 4 and 5 illustrate how
the dealer is embedded in the sales process and how the
contractual relation between the car manufacturer and the
dealer can be characterized.
3.2.2. Introduction to change initiative
The car manufacturer initiated a strategic sales initiative
in 2010. Target of this change program is to enhance the
point of contact to the customer. Therefore, most of the
centrally-designed concepts are rolled out at the dealerships.
The development and implementation of the change initia-
tive leads to a globally-standardized sales process at the deal-
erships.
In order to obtain a standardized premium customer ex-
perience at car dealerships, different concepts are holistically
implemented under the umbrella of this change initiative.
The most prominent concept is the Product Genius, who is
acting as a product specialist, matching the customers’ de-
mands with the product features. The Product Genius is in-
troduced into the dealerships as a new role among the ex-
isting sales staff. The customer relations of sales persons
change, as the Product Genius is now responsible for explain-
ing technical features to the customer without having a finan-
cial incentive to sell a car.
In addition, the Customer Treatment is standardized
through training and coaching of the staff at all levels of
the dealerships. Thus, the individual and self-determined
relation of the sales persons to the customer is restricted.
The use of iPads, including an app (Mobile Customizer)
for configuring the car with the customer, and a screen (Vir-
tual Product Presenter/VPP) for mirroring the configured car,
shall further improve the sales process.
Besides the standardization of the sales process including
the use of new IT tools, the change initiative targets a consis-
tent visual appearance of car dealerships; thus, the car manu-
facturer sells their dealers centrally-purchased premium fur-
niture (EPoS). The different and more open arrangement of
the workplace changes the customer relation as well.
In order to monitor the standardization of the sales pro-
cess and the fulfillment of the new Retail Standards, the car
manufacturer conducts Mystery Shopping at the dealerships.
The execution and, for most of the dealers, the results of the
Mystery Shops affect their dealer bonuses.
Implementation managers in the Headquarter and Na-
tional Sales Companies, as well as an external agency, who
is conducting the training and coaching modules, monitor
the implementation of the change initiative at the dealer-
ships. The implementation process within one market or re-
gion takes approximately two years, depending on the num-
ber of dealerships. The phases of the implementation are
pre-determined. Managers at the dealership are informed
and coached first, so they can serve as on-site change agents.
Extensive change and communication campaigns support the
implementation managers at the National Sales Company in
explaining the targets and benefits of the change initiative to
the dealers.
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Figure 4: Sales process of car manufacturer; Source: Own figure
Figure 5: Contractual relation of dealer and car manufacturer; Source: Own figure
Besides financial support from the car manufacturer for
the initial funding, the dealers pay most of the implementa-
tion cost. Further, most concepts of the change initiative are
part of the Retail Standards and the bonus system (see Fig-
ure 4), which makes the implementation of these elements
mandatory for the dealer.
Overall, the project holds many benefits for the dealer.
However, their autonomy in designing the sales process at
their dealership is restricted through the implementation of
the change initiative. Confronted with this new situation, the
question arises at what point do ambiguity and uncertainty,
which serve as triggers for sensemaking, are generated at the
dealer.
3.2.3. Case study sampling
Car dealers, who can own one or more dealerships, are
selected as the recipient group for the research of this the-
sis since they play a key role in the implementation of the
aforementioned change initiative, yet their role (franchisees
that implement franchisor-initiated change), remains under-
researched in the literature. The new strategy requires the
dealers to undertake significant structural change at their
dealership(s). Similar to middle managers, dealers can be
the target and agents of change (Balogun and Johnson,
2005). Further, they have to implement the plans devised by
the Headquarter and National Sales Companies, with little
involvement in the upfront decision-making.
The primary method for collecting data is focused inter-
views, which were conducted with 5 dealers in April and May
2015. As I worked in the Project Management Office of the
central project team for two years (08/2012 – 10/2014), I
have profound knowledge of the project and access to the
central and market implementation managers of the change
initiative, who helped when choosing appropriate dealers
for the interview. Dealers from the sales region “Northern
Europe” were chosen for the case study as the heteroge-
neous circumstances of dealers operating in different markets
ensure environmental variance (Pettigrew, 1990). Further,
the implementation of the change initiative is completed at
most of the dealerships, which is a requirement for the in-
terview. The sales region “Northern Europe” contains 7 mar-
kets, namely Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Estonia,
Lithuania, and Latvia. The total number of dealerships in
Northern Europe adds up to 128 (Anon.). Each of the mar-
kets has a National Sales Company located in their country,
serving as the main contact point for the dealers. The Re-
gional Office of “Northern Europe” is in Sweden and serves
as an interface to the Headquarters. Due to the relatively
small market sizes, some of the departments, such as Dealer
Development or Product Management, are centralized in the
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Regional Office leading to the dealers contacting both their
National Sales Company and the Regional Office, depending
on the topic raised.
The 5 dealers interviewed operate in Denmark (2), Swe-
den (1) and Finland (2), which represent 3 out of the 4
biggest markets in “Northern Europe” regarding sales vol-
ume and number of dealerships. In Denmark, 2 dealers are
operating a total of 10 dealerships; there are 49 dealerships
in Sweden; and the Finnish market contains 20 dealerships
(Anon.). The requirements for the dealers’ participation in
the interview are a completed implementation of the change
initiative, a minimum annual sales of 1,000 cars in all dealer-
ships operated by the dealer, guaranteeing sales relevance for
Northern Europe, and of course, a willingness of the dealer
to participate in the interview. The interviewees were either
board members of the dealer or sales managers, depending
on the person in charge of the implementation of the change
initiative at the dealerships. Within the interview session,
one or two managers participated in the interview, depend-
ing on their field of responsibility, ensuring that all questions
could be answered. As the focus of the case study is on the
sensemaking of the dealer, interviewees work only on the
management level, and thus there are no further interviews
conducted with other employees at the dealership. Five inter-
views in total ensure that general conclusions about dealers
operating in different market circumstances can be drawn,
even within the limited time for this thesis.
3.3. Crafting instruments and protocols
The next step is about the data collection method.
Theory-building studies usually use multiple data collec-
tion methods (Eisenhardt, 1989). The rationale is, similar to
theory-testing, to obtain stronger confirmation of constructs.
Data can be collected through diverse sources of evidence
such as documentation, archival records, interviews, direct
observations, participant observations or physical artifacts
(Yin, 2003, p. 86). The so-called “triangulated methodol-
ogy” builds on three different sources of evidence to draw on
the particular and different strengths of various data collec-
tion methods (Pettigrew, 1990).
In line with former studies (Weber et al., 2015), the main
source of evidence for this thesis will be in-depth interviews.
The interviews are semi-structured and last approximately
sixty minutes. Interview questions are derived from a case
study protocol and are adjusted during the data collection
process as a consequence of the emergence of new and in-
teresting themes (Yin, 2003, p. 90; Eisenhardt, 1989). Each
interview is taped and transcribed to ensure the accuracy of
the followed analysis.
The biggest advantage of conducting interviews to gather
data is that the researcher can focus directly on the case study
topic and provide perceived causal inference. Possible dis-
advantages of interviews such as a response bias or a bias
due to constructed questions, led to the decision to integrate
further data sources. Archival documents are a good sup-
plement as they can be reviewed repeatedly and are not cre-
ated as a result of the case study. In order to get a better
understanding of the implementation process of the change
initiative, archival documents of change and communication
campaigns are considered (Yin, 2003, pp. 86).
To triangulate data, on-site observations were written
down during the dealer visits. These observations contain
both participants as well as site observations and are inte-
grated into the field study notes (Guest et al., 2013, p.93).
In preparation of the data collection and to increase the
reliability of the case study, a protocol is developed in ac-
cordance with Yin (2003). Using a protocol ensures that the
researcher stays focused on the purpose of the case study and
forces him to anticipate potential problems such as the way
the case study reports are to be completed. The case study
protocol contains an overview of the case study project, the
field procedures, the case study questions as well as a guide
for the case study report (Yin, 2003, p. 69). Thus, in con-
trast to a survey questionnaire, “the protocol contains the in-
strument as well as the procedures and general rules to be
followed in using the protocol” (Yin, 2003, p. 68). The case
study protocol for this thesis can be found in the appendix.
3.4. Entering the field
The next step of the research process determines the en-
tering of the field. As briefly mentioned in the context of
grounded theory, Glaser and Strauss (1967) recommend a
joint collection and analysis of data. While the degree of
overlap intended by Glaser and Strauss cannot be achieved in
the thesis, the analysis of data will already take place during
the data collection. As recommended by Eisenhardt (1989),
field notes, which are a running commentary to oneself, can
accomplish this overlap. Field notes serve as an idea book-
let to document everything that seems important to the re-
searcher.
Although the cases will be pre-defined, flexible and
opportunistic methods allow for adding questions or even
adapting the data collection methods. These adaptations are
not to be seen as unsystematic, but as a controlled opportu-
nity for the researcher to take advantage of the uniqueness
of cases – space can be opened up for emergent concepts
(Pettigrew, 1990).
3.5. Data analysis
The data analysis is decisive for the results of the case
study. There are traditionally two forms of analysis. (1) If
an analyst wants to convert qualitative data into a quantifi-
able form to test hypotheses, he codes the data first and then
analyzes it. “A code is an abbreviation or symbol applied to
a segment of words, in order to classify the words. Codes
are categories that usually derive from research questions,
hypotheses, key concepts, or important themes” (Miles and
Huberman, 1984, p. 56). (2) When the analyst wants to
generate theoretical ideas, he constantly redesigns and rein-
tegrates categories and their properties (Glaser and Strauss,
1967, p. 101). This thesis follows the constant compara-
tive method of qualitative analysis developed by Glaser and
Strauss, which is a combination of the two forms of analysis.
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When analyzing data, there are two different approaches
of starting the coding. On the one hand, Miles and Huber-
man (1984) recommend creating a “start list” of codes prior
to fieldwork. That list is derived from the theoretical frame-
work, research questions and hypothesis (Miles and Huber-
man, 1984, p. 57). Glaser and Strauss (1967) on the other
hand do not want to precode until data is collected, so data
gets well molded to the codes that represent them and the
analyst is more context sensitive. In accordance with Glaser
and Strauss (1967) the data for this thesis is coded during
the fieldwork.
The data analysis of this thesis starts with a within-case
analysis to become familiar with each case as a stand-alone
entity (Eisenhardt, 1989). Unique patterns can evolve, be-
fore being generalized through comparison. Based on de-
tailed case study write-ups for each site, each incident will
be coded into as many categories as possible so categories
that emerge fit the data basis. Categories are either self-
constructed (explanative), or abstracted (descriptive) from
the language of the situation.
The next stage of the data analysis is the cross-case anal-
ysis. As researchers are overwhelmed with data and simul-
taneously limited in their ability to process this data, the key
to a good cross-case comparison becomes looking at the data
in many divergent ways (Eisenhardt, 1989). The approach
of this thesis is to select categories first and then to look for
patterns – either within-group similarities or intergroup dif-
ferences. A pattern can further be characterized by frequency
(things happen often or rarely), correspondence (things hap-
pen in relation to other activities or events), and causation
(one causes another). In order to keep track of the compari-
son group, Glaser and Strauss define a rule for their constant
comparative model: “while coding an incident for a category,
compare it with the previous incident in the same category
and look for different groups coded in the same category”
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 106). The constant compari-
son of the incidents generates characteristics of the category.
Underlying uniformities or properties within the categories
will be discovered, so that categories can be consolidated.
Thus, as the theory evolves, categories will be reduced. Over
time, the researcher becomes committed to an evolving the-
ory, so the original list of categories is reduced to collect and
code data according to the boundaries of the theory. Then
he can focus on the comparison of incidents in the reduced
set of categories. As patterns between the categories evolve,
evidence for “why” behind relationships is researched and
insights are gained. The coding system of this thesis can be
found in the appendix.
Figure 6 shows how a general theory is to be derived from
a particular code.
3.6. Reaching closure
Eisenhardt (1989) names the last step of the research
process “reaching closure” and embraces two issues: when
to stop collecting more data and when to stop iterating be-
tween data and theory. “A researcher can always try to col-
lect more data for checking hypotheses or for generating new
properties, categories and hypotheses” (Glaser and Strauss,
1967, p. 111). According to grounded theory, a researcher
should stop adding cases when theoretical saturation is ac-
complished. This represents the point, at which additional
learning is marginal because the researcher observes phe-
nomena he has already seen before. The concept of satu-
ration does also apply for the iterating process. The iteration
process is completed when the incremental improvement to
the theory is minimal. The application of theoretical satura-
tion in this thesis is limited due to the predetermined amount
of time.
After the theory-based research process for this thesis was
outlined, provisions for the overall quality of the case study
need to be met. To ensure the quality of the research study,
Yin (2003) mentions four tests that are common to social re-
search methods. “Construct validity is about establishing a
correct operational measure for the concept being studied. . .
Internal validity ensures a causal relationship, whereby cer-
tain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions. . . Ex-
ternal validity identifies the extent to which findings can be
generalized. . . Finally, reliability demonstrates that the oper-
ations of a study can be repeated with the same results” (Yin,
2003, p. 34). In Figure 7 the case study tactics, which have
been discussed in the separate process steps, are related to
the so-called four design tests.
4. Results
The final product of the theory building differs among
concepts, conceptual frameworks and propositions. In line
with former studies on sensemaking of middle managers
(Balogun and Johnson, 2004; Balogun and Johnson, 2005;
Hope, 2010), this thesis will report the findings of the data
analysis using first- and second-order analysis according to
Van Maanen (1979). The first-order analysis tells the story of
the project implementation from the interviewees’ perspec-
tive and provides evidence for the coded themes through the
use of representative quotes from the interviews. Both the
descriptive properties of the studied scene and the intervie-
wees’ interpretation of what stands behind these properties
are first-order concepts. It is necessary to identify the change
interpretations of the dealers, any other events they perceive
to have an impact, and the change outcomes they observed
(Van Maanen, 1979).
The second-order analysis explores the patterning of the
first-order data and builds the explanatory framework. Many
second-order concepts are statements about relationships
between properties (Miles and Huberman, 1984, p. 104).
Van Maanen (1979) calls second-order findings “interpreta-
tions of interpretations” as they represent the researchers’
perception of the interviewees’ described incidents. There-
fore, second-order findings may converge with first-order in-
terpretations. Hence, it should be understood how the dealer
assigned meaning to the change interventions and how those
perceived interpretations led to subsequent change outcomes
(Van Maanen, 1979).
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Figure 6: Codes to theory model; Source: Own figure, in accordance with Miles and Huberman, 1984, p. 57
Figure 7: Case study tactics; Source: Own figure in accordance with Yin, 2003, p. 34
The bases for the first- and second-order analysis are
within- and cross-case analyses, whose use has been previ-
ously described and which can be found in the appendix.
4.1. First-order findings
The manually-obtained codes for change interventions,
other events and outcomes based on the dealer’s language
can be found in the appendix. The detailed codes were grad-
ually grouped into a set of broader categories related to:
• Evaluation of change initiative: first contact with the
project, implementation progress, evaluation of the
changes, project opportunities and challenges
• Evaluation of Retail Standards: The evaluation of Re-
tail Standards and the dealers’ ability to influence them
• Discursive practices within the dealer: Communication
within dealer including management and employees,
expectations of employees
• Discursive practices with other dealers: The overall re-
lation and the communication with other dealers dur-
ing the project implementation
• Discursive practices with the National Sales Company:
The overall relation and the communication with the
National Sales Company during the implementation,
the evaluation of skills
• Discursive practices with the Region: The overall rela-
tion and the communication with the Regional Office
during the implementation, the evaluation of skills
• Discursive practices with the Headquarter: The overall
relation and the communication with the Headquarter
during the implementation, the evaluation of skills
During the interview process, it became clear that the dealer’s
complex patterns of interaction during the change process,
his implementation experiences and the organizational con-
text in which he operates shaped his sensemaking. In ac-
cordance with Balogun (2003) a ‘visual mapping strategy’ is
used to illustrate the perceived interactions (Langley, 1999).
This serves as a basis for the first-order analysis that follows.
The first-order analysis is divided into three parts (T1, T2,
T3) based on the three steps of the sensemaking process,
which were outlined in the literature review.
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Figure 8: Visual mapping strategy; Source: Own figure
4.1.1. Development of new structures at dealerships (T1)
This phase includes the design of the change initiative,
the introduction to the dealers and his first interpretations.
The design of the initiative (1) took place within a project
team at the Headquarters. The communication material in-
cludes an implementation plan providing information about
the key milestones of the change initiative, the aimed timing
and the distribution of responsibilities. Either departments
within the Headquarters or the market, or an external im-
plementation agency was in charge of the implementation
process. The dealers didn’t feel that they could influence the
design of the change initiative or the implementation pro-
cess:
‘I think they come to us and that is how it is
done. I don’t have the feeling that I can impact
on those.’
‘We do not have the idea that we have an influ-
ence on anything. We got the idea that this is
what the concept is about from the Headquarter.’
The launch communication (2) at the dealers took place dif-
ferently. The communication material provided by the cen-
tral project team contains a checklist for the National Sales
Company’s staff, which includes, “conduct dealer briefings to
inform them about next steps”. However, how the introduc-
tion of the change initiative to the dealer should take place is
not predefined and thus is left up to the Region or National
Sales Company, which mainly interacts with the dealer. For
that purpose, the Region and National Sales Companies had a
variety of information material from the Headquarters, such
as the “EPoS Guide and Furniture Argumenter”, which is to
“be forwarded to the dealer”.
Region representatives introduced the change initiative
to the Danish and Swedish dealers. In Finland, a consultant
presented the concepts to the dealers. Although the launch
communication was different, the dealers commonly spoke
of an abstract presentation, lacking concrete consequences
for them at that time.
‘. . . And they presented this like they presented it
in Germany or in Poland or somewhere else.’
‘I think he didn’t know himself, too when he was
presenting the ideas for the first time.’
‘. . . It was not so concrete. I didn’t actually know
what was going to happen. It was sort of a nice
picture somewhere but no concrete footsteps like
‘now we are doing this, this, and this and the
schedule is this. So, it was a little bit abstract
at that time.’
‘It is a little bit more the big picture, but not that
concrete.’
Although, the first picture was abstract, the dealers com-
monly thought that the sales strategy led to significant
changes at their dealership including the standardization
of sales processes, an enhanced customer experience, the
modernization of sales tools and the showroom appearance.
The interpretations of the new structure (3) were ambiguous,
perceiving the overall ideas as positive, but the implementa-
tion as difficult:
‘We strongly believe that this could be a success.’
‘I think it is a big step to take. But it is the right
step to take.’
‘I think that was great that we did something. Be-
cause I think that it was quite old fashioned in
(franchisor).’
‘On paper the ideas are very good, but then how
to use everything in the daily work, that is our
challenge at the moment.’
‘I think they have not thought it through, how to
take this step and how to change the whole pro-
cesses.’
‘It seemed SO much at the same time, at once. I
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think the ideas are good. But I think they are try-
ing to implement it too fast and have not really
thought it through.’
4.1.2. Implementation of new structures at dealerships (T2)
This phase includes the training and installation of the
previously described concepts; the communication within the
dealer, with other dealers and with the franchisor; as well as
the handling of implementation difficulties.
The implementation of the change initiative is for the
most part completed at the visited dealerships. At the Danish
and Swedish dealers, the new furniture, the mobile tools, the
Product Genius and Mystery Shopping were implemented.
Due to the smaller size of the dealerships, the interviewed
Finnish dealers had not yet implemented the Product Genius.
During the installation and training (4), the interviewees
gained information on the new sales strategy differently. Ei-
ther they were trained themselves, or gathered information
through their employees who attended a training session. For
some, manuals served as an additional information source,
whereas others did not use them or did not have any. Overall,
some dealers said that they received enough and detailed in-
formation from the market whereas others claimed they had
to figure out how to implement the concepts themselves:
‘The trainings have been helpful.’
‘We had a lot of persons that came and told us
about the implementation. How it is going to
work and why of course we have to do this. So
that was good.’
‘We had one training in here just a few weeks
ago, also again with the consultant (name). He
showed us the use of the iPad, so now everyone
should know how to use it.’
‘The Product Genius had the training and we
have heard what they are training.’
‘We have very big manuals. And then we have a
lot of follow-ups’
‘We derived our knowledge from the manuals,
from the Retail Standards and from the test an-
swers from the Mystery Shopper.’
‘We don’t have any instruction manual.’
‘Yes, we make it by ourselves. Nobody answers to
that. And when we implement the Product Ge-
nius for instance or set up the Mobile Customizer,
we had to do everything ourselves. Not any sup-
port on that.’
Besides the training and information material, the intervie-
wees gained expertise through an exchange of experience (5)
with different people. Most of the interaction took place at
the dealer (5a). Some dealers conducted their own trainings
in addition to those provided by the franchisor in order to
fulfill the Retail Standards. Further, they had regular meet-
ings at both the management level and with the sales staff,
where they exchanged experiences:
‘The rules are set from (franchisor) but the daily
training is in the shop.’
‘We know that we have a how-to-do-it from (fran-
chisor) but everyday we are reminding ourselves,
training, so we are making sure that we give
every customer the right experience when they
come to the (brand) stores.’
‘We do it when we train and when we have our
meetings. What is good, what needs to be im-
proved. That is mainly in-house we do that.’
‘In our house, we have talked about it daily, how
to do things better.’
‘We have a small team here. We often talk di-
rectly how we can improve things; how we can
do things better. Also, I like to listen to my sales
guys, what their opinions are, how they see prob-
lems or issues.’
For further clarification, the dealer saw the interaction with
the National Sales Companies and Region (5b) as important.
The relationship with the National Sales Companies and the
Region was described as very positive. However, while some
dealers perceived the interaction with the franchisor as an ex-
change of experience, others perceived it as a unidirectional
communication.
‘The cooperation is very good.’
‘Our Region Manager is very, very good. I think
he is one of the best that I have ever met. And
one of the best I have ever worked with at (fran-
chisor).’
‘Yes, I talk to him on the phone every week and
then we meet at least one time a month.’
‘It is always a one-sided communication.’
‘Since I worked for (franchisor) I did not have
the impression that they like our comments on
anything and try to receive feedback.’
All interviewees said, that they exchanged experience with
other dealers (5c) informally. They did not schedule meet-
ings nor interact on a regular basis:
‘When we are meeting for sales meetings, or
something else, then we just chat to each other
and have a conversation. But it is nothing that is
put into meetings or schedules.’
During this phase, some of the interviewed dealers faced im-
plementation difficulties, whereas for some the implemen-
tation went very smoothly. Whether or not the dealers had
implementation difficulties, partially influenced the change
outcomes and their interaction processes.
For the dealers, which faced implementation difficulties,
the type of problem and the solution finding were considered
in more detail during the interviews. The implementation
difficulties (6a) mainly routed in the employees’ acceptance
of the new, more standardized sales process and infrastruc-
ture problems.
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‘I know the salesmen are afraid. They are afraid
to do wrong. This becomes so much of a burden.
So the only thing they are thinking about is not
to do wrong.’
‘Before this, they have always been doing it in
the same way and people get stuck to their own
ways of doing things. That is the problem.’
‘I think the main problem about the Product Ge-
nius is their ambitions to be a salesman.’
‘We lack of systems, sales systems actually, to
help the sales men in all that process.’
‘The VPP does not work so they cannot use the
iPad at the moment.’
‘Today we have to go into 5-6 different computer
programs just to make an offer...When (fran-
chisor) solves that problem everything will fall
into place.’
‘First, we built it with the iPad; as we cannot
link it to SA3, we have to do the same thing
within SA3 again; and then, when we have done
it there, we will do it within the CRM system.’
When a problem occurred, the dealers first tried to solve it on
their own, before reporting it to the National Sales Company
or Region (6b).
When involving the National Sales Company or Region,
the main problem was the lacking ability of the franchisor in
solving the problems (6c). When an implementation problem
occurred, most of the dealers stated that the National Sales
Company or the Region were not able to solve it.
‘I think the support should be at the importer.
But now, if I had any kind of problem I can’t call
them. No one knows about it. They haven’t used
it.’
‘I think that neither the consultant nor the im-
porter know how to use it. So we have to figure
it out ourselves.’
‘Yes, actually it is quite amusing that they tell
us that we have to use it but if we have some
questions, they can’t answer them.’
‘They just did not do their homework how to
solve the problems that come along.’
‘It has gone almost two years and we are still
waiting for them to come and solve the problem’
‘We are waiting that something will happen.’
‘The sales guys should already start in 2009 con-
figuring the cars with the customers on a big
screen and so on. But it has been postponed for
six years.’
The interviewees identified the lack of retail experience as
the main source for the National Sales Company’s or Re-
gion’s lacking ability to find solutions for their implementa-
tion problems. In addition, the project didn’t fit their market
circumstances completely.
‘I think importers and factories have one big
problem or challenge: the challenge is, they
don’t sell cars. They don’t see the customer, they
don’t know how to treat a customer, and they
don’t know what the customer expects.’
‘No manager or importer, have sold a car before.
They say, what they have to say but they don’t
really understand how the work is on the floor.
They don’t have retail experience.’ ‘They know a
lot about wholesale, but nothing about retail.’
‘Most of the employees at (franchisor) have never
been in a dealership.’
‘And I am not sure if the importer knows what
he is talking about. Someone told them that
(change initiative) has to be implemented and
they say that to us.’
Furthermore, the implementation plan of the Headquarters
does not contain steps that the National Sales Company or
the Region should follow, when implementation difficulties
occur.
For the problems that were solved, either in-house or with
the help of the National Sales Company, the implementation
was adjusted (6d).
4.1.3. Completion of implementation and evaluation of new
structures (T3)
This phase includes the completion of the implementation
and the dealers’ evaluation of the change initiative.
The implementation of the change initiative at the inter-
viewed dealers is for the most part completed (8). Through
the dealer visits it could be observed that the appearance of
the showrooms was indeed standardized. The elements of
the sales strategy were remarkable in all showrooms. Al-
though the size of the visited dealerships differed, the design
of the workplaces and the waiting areas for the customers
looked the same.
After the outcomes of the initiatives were observable in
the adapted sales processes, the dealer still perceived the
overall targets as positive. However, when looking at the in-
dividual concepts, the dealers partially rated the outcomes
differently (7).
The Mobile Customizer, which has been implemented at
all visited dealerships, was rated similarly. It was mainly per-
ceived as a support and modernization of the sales process.
Yet, most of the dealers criticized the app for not being har-
monized with existing IT systems, leading to inefficiencies in
the sales process.
‘It is a very good idea. I think it is much better
than what we had before.’
‘I think these are good tools, which can support
the selling process.’
‘We have something, at the moment, if a cus-
tomer is using our (franchisor) website, the con-
figuration tool, we cannot implement that to SA3
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directly or to the Mobile Customizer. We have to
build it again.’
‘And we hope that this system can one day sup-
port SA3. Because that would be the best way for
us, we would get better advantages if we could
configure a car with the iPad and then just send
the information to SA3.’
In the case of the new furniture, the interviewees valued the
consistent, premium showroom appearance and the high ac-
ceptance of the employees. However, the high investments
were perceived as a risk.
‘The employees of course they liked it. . . It is
always nice to get new furniture and it upgrades
the feeling of course.’
‘I think it is nice that the showrooms look alike
no matter where you go’
‘It is difficult to get the business case profitable,
with the total costs of this showroom, of all the
standards of (franchisor).’
‘It has a big influence on our economy.’
As previously mentioned, not all of the interviewed dealers
have employed a Product Genius at their dealerships. This is
mainly due to the different sizes of the dealerships. It is more
difficult for a dealership with fewer customers to have a full-
time employee who is used to the capacity of the tasks of a
Product Genius. Thus, implementing the concept would not
be profitable. The perception of the dealers who have em-
ployed a Product Genius was similar. On the one hand, the
new role led to an enhanced customer service through the
Product Genius’ product expertise and his customers’ need-
analysis. Further, the work division between the Product Ge-
nius and the salesmen led to higher efficiencies in the sales
process. On the other hand, the dealers had difficulties man-
aging the expectations of the Product Genius, who often had
ambitions taking over tasks of the salesmen.
When looking at the dealers’ evaluation of Mystery Shop-
ping, it is important to consider that the results of the Mys-
tery Shops are not part of the Dealer Bonus in all three mar-
kets. This could be one explanation for the different ratings
of Mystery Shopping. While some dealers perceived it as a
helpful tool to increase customer satisfaction and gain trans-
parency over the sales process, others said that it puts too
much pressure on the employees, effecting the dealers’ re-
sults negatively.
‘The report is helpful because it gives us an in-
sight of how customers thinks when they are
coming here. It also gives us an insight where
we could improve, which salesmen are doing a
good job and which we need to train more.’
‘I think it is a good thing to keep us sharp and
remember that we have to do it right and that
we have to do it right each time.’
‘If we fail, it cannot be that we are going to get
so hardly punished.’
‘It damages the treatment of real customers. The
salesmen are always thinking ‘Are you a Mystery
Shopper?’ They are always suspicious, afraid to
do wrong.’
4.2. Second-order findings
Included in the first-order analysis are descriptive find-
ings from the interviewees’ perspective about how and why
different change outcomes emerged. In order to find theo-
retical explanations for these descriptive first-order findings,
a second-order analysis follows.
A key factor in the dealers’ sensemaking is the social pro-
cesses of interaction in response to the design and launch of
the new structures (T1), the installation of the change initia-
tive at the dealer (T2) and the evaluation after the completed
implementation (T3). The first-order analysis reveals two di-
mensions of social processes of interaction, shaping the deal-
ers’ sensemaking, which serve as a basis for the explanatory
framework: the social processes of interaction within these
phases can be divided into vertical processes, which go be-
yond organizational boundaries and take place between the
dealer and the car manufacturer or between the dealer and
other dealers; and lateral processes, which stay within the
dealer. It can be seen that both vertical and lateral processes
of interaction affected the sensemaking of the dealer, but at
different stages.
In T1, the dealers’ sensemaking was triggered by the
change intervention itself and the initial communication by
the franchisor. The change initiative constituted a novel
and unexpected event for the dealer, which had a big im-
pact on his organizational identity. As the communication
of the change initiative implied ambiguous interpretations,
the dealer involved himself in a sensemaking process. In this
phase, mainly vertical processes of interaction took place.
Employees of the National Sales Company set meetings with
the dealer and introduced the change initiative themselves
or sent a consultant to present the main targets to the dealer.
The dealers commonly identified the premium customer ex-
perience and the standardization of sales processes as the
cornerstones of the visions. As these cornerstones are com-
monly perceived as reasonable, the overall idea was well
understood and accepted. However, the new vision of the
change initiative was not commonly created, but rather ex-
pressed through the National Sales Company, which can
be seen as sensegiving. The dealers would have preferred
a common sensemaking, so their insights were considered
during the design of the change initiative. Although the first
meaning creation by the dealer assigned positive attributes
to the vision of the change initiative, the feasibility of ap-
plying them to his own environment was seen critical. The
dealer found that he had not sufficient information through
the first presentation. Thus, he was trying to figure out the
meaning of the change effort, what its effect on him would
be and what his role would entail. By the end of T1, the
dealer had the awareness that a new way of thinking about
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retail structures were to come, but he was lacking knowledge
about concrete actions to follow.
In T2, the implementation of the new structures at the
dealer began. The installation of new hardware and the
training sessions at the dealer were organized by the fran-
chisor. Thus, the social processes of interaction were mostly
vertical at first. During the training sessions, the dealer could
now gather more concrete information through discussions
with representatives of the franchisor and partially obtained
additional information material on the individual concepts.
The dealer’s perception of the franchisor’s support during
that phase differed. Although the relation to the franchisor
and his intentions are positively perceived, his ability to con-
vey sufficient information to the dealer is questioned.
As there was still information lacking, the dealer ex-
changed experience, both laterally and vertically, after the
official training sessions given by the franchisor. Here, deal-
ers mostly conducted their own trainings or engaged in inter-
nal discussions to clarify open issues. So, the dealer involved
his employees into a common sensemaking process to inte-
grate their expertise on the dealer’s circumstances in order
to create a common understanding on the implications of
the change initiative. The input of both the employees and
the management at the dealer, as well as the processes of
social interaction between them were valued. Through the
involvement of the employees in the sensemaking process, le-
gitimacy was created resulting in the employees’ acceptance
of the changes in their working routines.
The vertical interaction processes with other dealers did
not take place on a regular basis and did not seem to play a
decisive role in the dealers’ sensemaking.
The dealer provided the franchisor with feedback at that
point but for the most part, no common sensemaking ac-
tivities followed. The dealer did not think that his feed-
back led to adaptations of the initiative or that the National
Sales Company forwarded the feedback to the Headquarters,
where the change initiative had been designed.
During the implementation, some dealers faced difficul-
ties. The main challenges were the adaptation of the employ-
ees’ working routines and the occurrence of infrastructure
problems such as the harmonization of the new tools with ex-
isting systems. Dealers complained that the implementation
of the concepts at the dealership was not thought through
in detail by the franchisor. Mainly concepts were not har-
monized with existing IT systems or Retail Standards in ad-
vance. These struggles created further ambiguity and led to
additional sensemaking activities at the dealer. In most cases,
the dealer tried to solve these problems internally. He pro-
vided his employees with additional trainings and collected
their feedback in regular meetings to help integrate the new
Retail Standards within daily work. Furthermore, the dealer
involved the franchisor asking either for additional training
sessions or for technical support. However, the interaction
with the franchisor mostly did not lead to a solution. The
dealer often got the impression that the franchisor could not
provide support during the integration of the change initia-
tive in his operative business as the franchisor lacked retail
experience and did not have enough knowledge on the de-
tailed functionalities of the concepts.
In T3, the implementation of the change initiative at
the dealer was completed and outcomes could be observed,
which served as input for new sensemaking. At this point,
the dealer mostly observed positive impacts on the results
of his business unit such as increased customer satisfaction
and sales volume. The dealer was able to learn about the
change by taking actions and observing the cues generated
by his actions. Regular meetings at the dealership secured a
continuous exchange of experience between the employees,
who applied elements of the change initiative in the sales
process. Mystery Shopping at the dealerships provided input
for both the franchisor and the dealer, who could review if
the elements of the change initiative had been integrated
into the sales process.
Further, the application of the change initiative at the
dealership tested the dealers’ provisional understanding gen-
erated through his prior sensemaking activities. Lastly, the
environment at the dealership has been changed through
the implementation of the change initiative and therefore
changed the situation that initially triggered the dealer’s
sensemaking.
5. Discussion
The idea that social processes of interaction impact
the sensemaking activities of organizational actors during
change is well accepted (Balogun and Johnson, 2004; Ba-
logun and Johnson, 2005; Hope, 2010). The contribution
of the framework presented in this thesis is the distinction
between vertical and lateral processes of interaction and the
empirically-based concept it offers to explain how sense-
making takes place during inter-organizational change. This
thesis links inter-recipient sensemaking activities within and
across organizational boundaries to implementation out-
comes. Key is not that social processes of interaction during
sensemaking occur, but how they influence individuals’ in-
terpretations when the change design and the change imple-
mentation take place at different organizations.
Generally speaking, the findings show that a franchisee,
who operates his own business and has his unit results at
stake, has the pressure of implementing the change initiative
well. Thus, he has an increased pressure of involving himself
in sensemaking activities.
The second-order analysis reveals that organizational
boundaries hinder common sensemaking activities between
the franchisee and the franchisor. Franchisors provide the
franchisee with an already-established vision and implemen-
tation steps to follow. A lack of prior common sensemaking
activities during the change design leads to the franchisee’s
lack of trust and belief in the legitimacy of the change initia-
tive. As other studies on the role of franchisees during change
suggest, trust in the expected profitability of the change ini-
tiative has a high impact on the adaption of a constructive
response by the franchisee. Further, it is shown that the
involvement of franchisees in the strategic decision-making
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process can create this trust (Croonen, 2010). Looking at
studies on sensemaking, it is also shown that the involve-
ment of stakeholders in the design of the change initiative
creates legitimacy (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991).
When formulating a new vision, the franchisor shall in-
tegrate unquestionable goals, which serve his and the fran-
chisees interest at the same time (e.g. higher customer satis-
faction, higher sales volume). Similar to other studies on
sensemaking during change, the case study of this thesis
shows that these unquestionable goals lead to a shared un-
derstanding and a positive acceptance of the overall vision
(Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991).
However, when planning the implementation steps at the
franchisees’ business unit, the franchisees’ trust in the fran-
chisors’ ability to improve his business processes is low. Al-
though the franchisor and the franchisee share overall goals,
the franchisees’ business interest is based on operative ex-
perience whereas the franchisor is thinking more strategi-
cally, having the overall targets of the franchisor in mind.
These different perspectives and also past experiences evolv-
ing from different working routines, lead to different inter-
pretations of the change design. Thus, involving in common
sensemaking activities would help to share these perspectives
and create a common picture.
Beyond that, studies on franchising reveal that trust in
the franchisor influences the response of franchisees during
change (?). This thesis shows that franchisees’ trust is not
only influenced by the franchisors’ operative skills, but is also
affected through his troubleshooting during the change im-
plementation.
Similar to the studies on the role of middle managers
during change (Balogun and Johnson, 2004), most of the
franchisees’ sensemaking activities during the change imple-
mentation occur in the absence of the actor, who designed
the change. The most important sparing partners of middle
managers are on the same hierarchical level and entail a sim-
ilar role during the implementation (Balogun and Johnson,
2004). Transferring that to franchisees, the exchange of ex-
perience with other franchisees is rather informal and has
little impact on the sensemaking of franchisees.
The franchisee mainly integrates the employees of his
business unit into his sensemaking activities. However, in
contrast to middle managers, who share their understandings
in unofficial settings such as rumors, stories or gossip, the
franchisee organizes official meetings and trainings to create
common interpretations. Thereby, experiences of applying
the change initiative into daily working routines are shared
among managers and employees. The creation of shared in-
terpretations also creates legitimacy among the employees
towards the change design and reduces their uncertainties
towards their new working routines.
Besides the interaction processes during the implemen-
tation, this thesis shows how franchisees further involve in
sensemaking through the observation of change outcomes at
their business units.
5.1. Practical implications
The franchisor provides a plan for change, but the way
this plan actually operates is determined by the new behav-
ioral routines created by the franchisees through their inter-
pretation of and response to franchisors’ initiatives. Fran-
chisees can react differently to franchisor-initiated changes.
As destructive responses can seriously harm the franchise sys-
tem and thus the retail performance of a company, the fran-
chisor should anticipate and prevent the franchisees’ destruc-
tive reaction (?). Analyzing the franchisees’ sensemaking ac-
tivities provides useful insights for the franchisor planning to
implement change initiatives at his franchisees.
Since the findings show the key role franchisees entail
during franchisor-initiated change and how they accomplish
sense of a planned initiative, like other studies, this thesis
questions the feasibility of top-down control of change pro-
grams (Balogun and Johnson, 2005). Top-down control in
inter-organizational change refers to the control the fran-
chisor exerts on the franchisee.
Managing change includes the creation of trust and le-
gitimacy. Thus, looking at inter-organizational change from
a sensemaking perspective shows that managing change is
less about directing and more about supporting franchisees’
sensemaking processes to achieve an alignment of interpre-
tations. This is especially important in franchising, where
the franchisee carries more economic risks than actors within
organizations. Shared sensemaking activities and aligned in-
terpretations, in both the change design and the implementa-
tion, create positive acceptance of the franchisee towards the
change initiative and helps the franchisor to gain insights into
the operative business processes. Involving the franchisee in
the design of new structures in their market and adapting the
initiative together to market circumstances, increases legiti-
macy at the franchisee. Further, an increased knowledge and
consideration of the business processes at the franchisee, cre-
ates trust in and trustworthiness of the franchisor, which con-
stitutes a critical factor of success. The franchisor is not able
to manage lateral processes occurring in his absence, but he
can shape his interactions with the franchisee. Besides con-
sidering the franchisees’ insights in the change design, trust
is also accomplished through efficient troubleshooting in the
change implementation.
5.2. Limitations
The limitations of this thesis need to be considered. Ques-
tions of generalizability arise, as case study research is, by
nature, situational. This is particularly influenced through
the focus on franchising systems, which is an extreme case
of inter-organizational change. The research approach, the
case study setting, and the findings are interwoven.
Further, although, environmental variations were consid-
ered in the case study sampling, the number of interviewed
franchisees is limited due to the time restrictions of this the-
sis. As the interviews served as the primary data source, the
actions taken by the franchisor and the reactions of the em-
ployees at the franchisees’ business unit are mainly antici-
T. Langenmayr / Junior Management Science 4(2) (2019) 173-194 193
pated based on the franchisees’ responses. Thus, the display
of the change process can be biased.
Although three different data sources were considered
for the analysis, the researcher was not able to observe the
interviewees’ real-time behavior during the change process.
Lastly, the researcher’s tie to the franchisor, through prior
work experience, might have influenced the responses of the
franchisees.
Despite these limitations, this thesis provides a useful
foundation for future studies on sensemaking during inter-
organizational change.
5.3. Future research
One promising direction for future research could be the
investigation of the complete sensemaking-sensegiving pro-
cess during inter-organizational change. Thereby, the sense-
giving activities across organizational boundaries, initiated
by both the franchisor and the franchisee, could be of inter-
est. In addition, analyzing the sensemaking-sensegiving ac-
tivities at the franchisee, considering the management and
the employees, could create useful insights. The findings of
this thesis suggest that the adaptation of the franchisees’ em-
ployees’ behavior has a high impact on the success of change
initiatives. Thus, the adaptation process of their working rou-
tines should be investigated. Interaction processes with their
management and, across organizational boundaries, with the
customer might influence their sensemaking activities. In
the end, the customers’ reaction and buying behavior con-
stitutes the success of the change initiative. Besides further
investigating franchisor-initiated change at franchisees, this
thesis could serve as a basis for investigating other forms of
inter-organizational change, considering different industries
or different stakeholders.
6. Conclusion
This thesis has examined the sensemaking of franchisees’
during franchisor-initiated change with the use of a holistic
multiple case study. It is the first to analyze sensemaking
during inter-organizational change.
Overall, it was shown that franchisees play an important
role in implementing strategic change. Their actions can ei-
ther support or be convergent to change goals set by the
franchisor. Thus, understanding the processes through which
franchisees’ work to assign meaning to a change initiative is
of highest interest to the franchisor.
The analysis revealed that franchisees’ social processes of
interaction mainly affect their sensemaking. A distinction be-
tween lateral and vertical processes of interaction enabled a
deeper analysis of processes within and across their organi-
zational boundaries. So far only few authors analyzed the so-
cial process of interaction during sensemaking (Balogun and
Johnson, 2004; Balogun and Johnson, 2005; Hope, 2010).
In contrast to studies on intra-organizational change, it was
shown that franchisees mainly interact within their organi-
zational boundaries when forming change interpretations.
The communication across organizational boundaries with
the franchisor was often unidirectional. Thus, not many com-
mon sensemaking activities took place, which created the
risk of misaligned change interpretations of the franchisor
and the franchisee. This finding led to the practical advice
to franchisors to align their interpretations with the fran-
chisees’ through more common sensemaking activities during
the change design and implementation. The involvement of
franchisees creates trust and legitimacy, and thus it increases
the chances of a positive change outcome.
In accordance with other studies (Gioia and Chittipeddi,
1991), the findings of this thesis show how the integration of
shared and unquestionable goals into the vision formulation
creates positive change interpretations at the franchisee.
The thesis also finds similarities to studies, which iden-
tify the observation of change outcomes as additional input
for sensemaking activities (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014).
The identification of underlying similarities in phenomena in-
creased the internal validity and generalizability of this the-
sis, which is especially important in theory building as the
number of cases is limited. The differences to previous stud-
ies underline the relevance of the study conducted.
Future research should aim to better understand the
overall sensemaking-sensegiving process for all actors dur-
ing inter-organizational change.
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